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  A Further View on Current Account, Capital Account and Target2 Balances: Assessing the
Eﬀects on Capital Structure and Economic Welfare
Friedrich L. Sell and Beate Sauer
September 2011
Abstract
In this paper, we ﬁrst present the state and the development of the European capital
and current account imbalances. We demonstrate how large the heterogeneity among
European countries is and that clustering here diﬀerent types of countries is possible, but
that it leads to diﬀerent groupings than what has been labeled the PIGS or better GIPS
countries on the one side and the GLNF countries on the other side. The same applies
when it comes to cluster countries according to the debt ratio criterion. Hereafter, we put
forward our own description of the mentioned ECB implicit ﬁnancing scheme(s), among
other things extending and complementing the recent base money market (supply and
demand) analysis given by H.-W. Sinn and T. Wollmershäuser (2011). The core of the
paper consists in a modiﬁed model of the New Austrian School of Economics – in the
tradition of F. A. v. Hayek (1929, 1931) and in the vein of R. M. Garrison (2002) – which
enables us to discuss the current distortions introduced by the Target2 credit channel into
the capital markets of selected EMU countries and to detect its most important economic
consequences. This part of the paper ends with a static welfare evaluation. Finally, we
come up with some conclusions and suggestions for economic policy.
Keywords: Target2 balances, current account deﬁcits, ECB monetary policy, New Aus-
trian Economics
JEL Classiﬁcation:D61, E52, E58, F32, F34 1
1 Introduction
Much earlier this year, H.-W. Sinn has opened a widespread discussion on the pitfalls of the
so-called “Target2 balances” (Sinn 2011b, Sinn 2011c). The issue was debated in the ﬁrst
place in newspapers and weekly journals and, as a matter of fact, became quite heated. In
the meantime, several authors – including Sinn and his co-author Wollmershäuser (2011) –
have pinned down their respective ideas in more detailed and extensive working papers.
This was and is very helpful for a rationalization of the discussion.
The purpose of our own paper is not to add one more critical comment on H.-W. Sinn’s
“ECB’s stealth bailout” thesis (2011a). It is unnecessary for the simple reason that, by
and large, we agree to his view that the Target2 mechanism has initiated since 2008
a new channel of (true and additional) credits to the so-called GIPS (Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain) countries (which, by the way is much more adequate, neutral and less
discriminative than to talk of PIGS), it has enabled involuntary capital exports from the
GLNF (Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Finland) countries to the GIPS countries
leaving, ceteris paribus, the total monetary base of the Euro area unchanged.
Until now, both Sinn and his commentators have concentrated their interest on a number
of economic eﬀects going along with the Target2 mechanism such as the ﬁscal nature of
the involved money ﬂows, the displacement of credits to the private sector in the “core”
countries, the “tacit” role of the ECB, which for the time being has allowed the GIPS
countries via Target2 a level of absorption unthinkable without this ﬁnancing option. Our
own interest in the subject has a number of diﬀerent and additional aspects:
In the second section of the paper, we will ﬁrst present the state and the development
of the European capital and current account imbalances. We will demonstrate how large
the heterogeneity among European countries is and that clustering here diﬀerent types of
countries is possible, but that it leads to diﬀerent groupings than what has been labeled2 2 INTER-EUROSYSTEM CAPITAL AND CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES
the PIGS or better GIPS countries on the one side and the GLNF countries on the other
side. The same applies when it comes to cluster countries according to the debt ratio
criterion.
In the third section, we will present our own description of the mentioned ECB im-
plicit ﬁnancing scheme(s), among other things extending and complementing the recent
base money market (supply and demand) analysis given by Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo
Wollmershäuser (2011).
In the fourth section, we will make use of a modiﬁed model of the New Austrian School
of Economics – in the tradition of Friedrich A. v. Hayek (1929, 1931) and in the vein of
Roger M. Garrison (2002) – which enables us to discuss the current distortions introduced
by the Target2 credit channel into the capital markets of selected EMU countries and to
detect its most important economic consequences. This part of the paper ends with a
static welfare evaluation.
The ﬁfth section comes up with some conclusions and suggestions for economic policy.
2 Inter-Eurosystem Capital and Current Account Im-
balances
Since the introduction of the common European currency in 2002, the current account
imbalances of the Eurosystem member states increased signiﬁcantly, amongst other things
due to the disappearance of any exchange rate risk. Concerning trade, Germany is one
of the countries mostly proﬁting from the Euro, whereas part of the GIPS countries
suﬀer from their loss of monetary policy control and especially from the omission of the
possibility of currency depreciation. The divergence of country speciﬁc interest rates in
the capital market makes another contribution to this misery.3
To show the countries’ diversiﬁcation and therefore the European heterogeneity, Figure 1
contrasts the current account imbalances of the Euro countries and their capital account
imbalances at the end of 2009 (up-to-date ﬁnal data is not available). The positive part
of the vertical axis shows current account surpluses, the negative part current account
deﬁcits. The capital account surpluses can be seen on the right part of the horizontal
axis, capital account deﬁcits on the left. Germany, for example, can be found in the
northwestern quadrant, meaning it has a current account surplus and a capital account
deﬁcit (net capital outﬂows), whereas Greece (on the bottom right) has a current account
deﬁcit and net capital inﬂows. As we will see below, this is exactly the situation one
considers as Target2 liabilities enter the balance of payments as capital import and Target2
claims enter as capital export.
Figure 1: Capital and Current Account Imbalances in the Eurosystem, end 2009, % of GDP
 
Source: IMF (2010), Balance of Payments Statistics, Yearbook, Part I: Country Tables and IMF World
Economic Outlook database, own depiction.4 2 INTER-EUROSYSTEM CAPITAL AND CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES
Besides, as it is already shown in several recent papers, the current account surpluses of
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and – with respect to the capital account imbalance –
outlier Finland (GLNF), the countries with the largest Target2 claims, approximately
correspond to the accumulated current account deﬁcits of the GIPS countries. Figure 2
pictures this fact.

















































































































GLNF (left scale) GIPS (right scale)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011, own depiction.
One can only identify small deviations between the two curve shapes. But from Figure 1
one has to recognize that the clusters of GIPS and GLNF were built solely on the basis of
Target2 balances (see Figure 4). An aggregation on the basis of the capital account imbal-
ances or the current account imbalances would diﬀer. Then one would rather aggregate
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Estonia as well as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and
Cyprus. With respect to the balance of payment positions in Figure 1, the outlier of the
GLNF aggregate can be identiﬁed as Finland with a capital account surplus; outlier in the
GIPS aggregate is Ireland with a capital account deﬁcit. The special case of Ireland can be5
explained by the massive capital ﬂight out of Ireland since 2008 and its large banking sys-
tem compared to the country’s size (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 35). Since 2008, it
was the other way round in Finland: massive capital inﬂows by direct investments, loans,
deposits, and trade credits (Bank of Finland 2010) as well as repatriation of capital from
subsidiaries and foreign portfolio investments due to the ﬁnancial crisis (Bank of Finland
2007). Even the Finnish employment pension funds reduced their investments in foreign
equities and funds (Bank of Finland 2008). The current account balance in both outlier
countries (Ireland and Finland) is as one expects it; a deﬁcit in Ireland and a surplus in
Finland. Therefore the latter one has a surplus in the current and in the capital account.
One would expect that the balance of payments is balanced via reserve assets, but for
Finland this is not the case; since October 2008 errors and omissions rose signiﬁcantly.
The Bank of Finland (2008, p. 30) explained this as follows: “Non-ﬁnancial corporations,
banks and investors are increasingly using ﬁnancial derivatives. Current surveys do not
appear to cover this area adequately. Interbank wholesale money markets involve large
sums of money, and it is possible that this area is also not wholly covered with traditional
statistics. In addition, the BOP statistics have only recently introduced a new method
for the compilation of securities data on the basis of new types of information.” Ireland
is faced with the opposite situation: a current and a capital account deﬁcit; its balance
of payments is balanced via large positive errors and omissions. Estonia is a somewhat
special case, too: it introduced the Euro only in January 2011, and it changed its current
account imbalance from deﬁcit to surplus as well as its capital account imbalance from
surplus to deﬁcit at the beginning of 2009. The current account development was mainly
driven by the slump of domestic demand after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and
the price drop in imported goods (Bank of Estonia 2009, p. 4). This leads to the situation
that Estonia became a net external lender due to the change in savings and investment
ratios. “The external sector surplus was not fully invested in Estonia and the earlier large
capital net inﬂow was replaced by a net outﬂow.” (Bank of Estonia 2009, p. 10) The6 2 INTER-EUROSYSTEM CAPITAL AND CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES
withdrawing of liquidity by parent banks intensiﬁed the capital outﬂows (Bank of Estonia
2009, p. 4). These country examples demonstrate the massive and diﬀerent eﬀects of the
ﬁnancial crisis on the EMU countries and the varied problems the Eurosystem is now
faced with due to the “new fundamentals”.
Also the domestic debt rating would show a totally diﬀerent aggregation of countries (see
Figure 3). Lots of countries are located between GIPS (black framed) and GLNF (black).
But the consideration of the governmental debt level is not unnecessary, because it is –
inter alia – responsible for the yield spreads of government bonds in the capital market and
therefore eﬀects the ﬁnancing options of a country, e.g. the possibilities to pay a current
account deﬁcit. And unlike Storbeck (2011) blogged in June, every current account deﬁcit
has to be ﬁnanced by a capital account surplus meaning by net capital inﬂows, also in a
monetary union. This is simply the mechanism of the balance of payments theory.









Source: Eurostat, newsrelease euroindicators, April 26th 2011,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-26042011-AP/EN/2-26042011-AP-EN.PDF
own depiction.7
And this is exactly the crucial point where Target2 comes into play as one ﬁnancing option
– as Sinn calls it. Furthermore, that is why the two country clusters were built on the
basis of Target2 balances and not on the basis of balance of payments data or debt ratios.
The Target2 mechanism and the respective national Target2 balances are the facts we
focus on.
3 Target2 and its Importance as “Stealth Bailout”
Similarly to the current account imbalances in the Eurosystem, it is already known what
countries record Target2 surpluses and what countries are the beneﬁciaries of this pos-
sibility to ﬁnance themselves via the ECB. Figure 4 shows the balances of Target2 as
identiﬁed at the end of 2010. As expected, Germany is far and away the largest creditor
to the system, the GIPS countries are the largest debtors.
Figure 4: Target2 imbalances in the Eurosystem at the end of 2010
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, March 2011, p. 35.8 3 TARGET2 AND ITS IMPORTANCE AS “STEALTH BAILOUT”
But what are the Target2 balances? Where do they come from, and how does this payment
system work? We will give a short overview of the most important facts on this system:
Since the end of 2007, Target2 is the successor mechanism of Target, the original payment
system of the Eurosystem, meaning “Trans-European Automated Realtime Gross settle-
ment Express Transfer system” (European Central Bank 2010, p. 5). Nearly all payments
between the Euro countries are operated via this mechanism. “Cross-border payments
that arise, say, from foreign trade transactions or from securities or lending transactions
with non-residents are normally carried out via the banking system.” (Deutsche Bundes-
bank 2011, p. 34) This means, Target2 balances are – in general – not a state of emergency,
but usual business between the national central banks of the Eurosystem and the ECB.
Every payment between commercial banks in two Euro countries has to be transferred via
the national central banks and the ECB. A direct payment transfer from one commercial
bank to a foreign commercial bank is not possible.
In April, Ruhkamp (2011) designed an example to illustrate the payment ﬂows from one
institution to another. Since then, this example was used several times for argumentation
in the discussion on Target2: A foreign company (originally it was an Irish farmer, in Sinn
and Wollmershäuser (2011) it is a Greek transport company) buys a German vehicle. We
designed the example with an Irish company. The German company delivers the vehicle
(here with a value of 100 Euro) to the Irish company. In Figure 5 this transaction is shown
at the bottom with the sold arrow from right to left. The foreign commercial bank (Anglo
Irish Bank) transfers the payment to the German commercial bank (Commerzbank). But
this does not work directly. That is why the respective arrow is dashed. The foreign
commercial bank transfers the payment to the foreign central bank (Central Bank of
Ireland), which transfers the payment to the ECB. From there the payment ﬂows to the
Deutsche Bundesbank, which transfers the payment to the Commerzbank. The Central
Bank of Ireland is now a debtor to the ECB (it destroyed base money), the Deutsche
Bundesbank is a creditor to the ECB (it created base money), both causing the national9
Target2 balances. In the ECB’s balance sheet the Target2 balances cancel out, except for
the balances via non-Euro countries. This is the ECB’s deﬁcit shown in Figure 4. Any
realized loss (“... regardless of which national bank records it.” (Deutsche Bundesbank
2011, p. 35)) in the Target2 mechanism, e.g. due to a default, “... would be shared
among the national banks in line with the capital key.” (Deutsche Bundesbank 2011,
p. 35) Usually (meaning in non-crisis times), “... temporary TARGET2 positions [are] ...
quickly reduced by private capital ﬂows.” (Deutsche Bundesbank 2011, p. 35)
Figure 5: Example for Inter-Eurosystem Payment Flows
 
Source: Own depiction.1
1We developed our depiction independently and before Abad et al. (2011) published a similar one in
their paper.10 3 TARGET2 AND ITS IMPORTANCE AS “STEALTH BAILOUT”
Since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007 this compensation via private capital
ﬂows no longer worked. “At least initially and in part, funding of weak governments was
taken over by the Eurosystem. Government bonds were sold to national banks, which
funded these purchases by borrowing from the ES [Eurosystem], with the same bonds
used as collateral for the loans.” (Hooper et al. 2011, p. 5) This circumstance led Prof.
Sinn to call the ﬁnancing via Target2 a “stealth bailout” (2011a). During the years,
Target2 balances began to rise (surpluses grew as well as deﬁcits). The preliminary result
is the already shown situation in Figure 4. Bindseil and König (2011, p. 21) pointed out
that even before 2007 current account deﬁcits existed and Target2 imbalances would have
been possible. In general, this statement is true. But they ignored the fact that prior to
the crisis the ﬁnancial crosscurrents took place on the private capital market, wherefore
the Target2 balances were unimportant as they are only one possibility to ﬁnance current
account deﬁcits (see Buiter et al. 2011, p. 13). Furthermore, Bindseil and König (2011)
as well as Buiter et al. (2011) all did the same error in reasoning when arguing that
the current account deﬁcit of a single country does not correspond to the respective
Target2 liability. Of course it does not: the Target mechanism/argumentation works on
the aggregate level.
But what eﬀects do the Target2 balances have on the national money markets? How is it
possible to show the rearrangement of base money between the Target2 creditor and the
debtor countries, the destroying and creating of base money?
We will describe the eﬀect of Target2 balances on the base money market, in part follow-
ing Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011). Figure 6 shows the base money market for countries
with Target2 claims against the ECB, here namely the largest claim holders Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Finland (GLNF). The demand curve is a curve with neg-
ative slope due to the fact that the interest rate can be interpreted as opportunity costs
of holding money: The higher the interest rate is, the less banks demand money. The
monetary base in general consists of the money in circulation and the reserves that com-11
mercial banks hold at the central bank. At the given main reﬁnancing rate there exists a
kind of natural limit to the base money demand depending on “the economic activity and
the payment habits prevailing in the country” (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 18).












TC = Target2 claims
OBM = original base money
base money
demanded
Source: Own depiction following Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 18.
Because Target2 claims belong to the monetary base, commercial banks now demand less
original base money (OBM) via reﬁnancing instruments, whereas original base money
means money that is created via foreign currency and/or gold purchases and reﬁnancing
operations (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 9). In Figure 6 this lower demand for base
money is shown as a shift of the reﬁnancing demand curve to the left in the extent of
the Target2 claims. Without Target2 balances a country would have asked the amount
OBM0 completely via the reﬁnancing instruments of the central bank, with holding Tar-
get2 claims TC this amount is reduced to OBM1. Sinn and Wollmershäuser call this a
“crowding out of reﬁnancing credit (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 19). The total
demand for base money is constant, only the source of base money changes. In credi-12 3 TARGET2 AND ITS IMPORTANCE AS “STEALTH BAILOUT”
tor countries, part of the base money is the money created via Target2 as we explained
above in Figure 5. Buiter et al. (2011) tried to contradict Sinn’s argumentation at this
point by stating that this crowding out and the constant base money are just one pos-
sible scenario. But eﬀectively they tell the same in diﬀerent words. In their view, it is
the choice of banks in the GLNF countries to demand original base money additionally
to their Target2 claims, there does not have to be a crowding out (Buiter et al. 2011,
p. 8). Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) pose it the other way round, arguing that not
the base money supply is restricted, but the decision is about the base money demand
at a certain interest rate. In both argumentations the quintessence is: the decision about
a possible “crowding out of reﬁnancing credit” is made by the commercial banks in the
GLNF countries and therefore on the demand side (endogenously determined); it is not
a caused one by the GLNF central banks. Maybe the wording “crowding out” in this
situation is a little misleading because usually this term is used for forced action and not
for action on own decisions.
Analogously, we can depict the base money market for the GIPS countries. This is done
in Figure 7. Target2 liabilities to the ECB can be pictured as “negative base money”
since Target2 claims are “positive base money” and Target2 liabilities mean destroying
base money. Without the existence of Target2 balances a country asks for the amount
of OBM0 at the given main reﬁnancing rate. If the country holds Target2 liabilities,
this amount TL has to be demanded additionally. In our ﬁgure, this means a shift of
the demand curve to the right (the dashed demand curve) in the extent of the Target2
liabilities. The original base money demand expands to OBM1 in contrast to the creditor
countries, where the original base money demand is reduced, because the additional base
money can only be demanded via the central bank’s reﬁnancing operations.13
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The ECB is not able to control this re-distribution of base money from one country
to another; at best the total amount via reﬁnancing operations could be ﬁxed at some
extent. But since October 2008 this is not the case: The ECB decided that “the weekly
main reﬁnancing operations will be carried out through a ﬁxed rate tender procedure
with full allotment at the inter-est rate on the main reﬁnancing operation” (European
Central Bank 2008). In June 2011, the ECB aﬃrms “to continue conducting its main
reﬁnancing operations (MROs) as ﬁxed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as
long as necessary, and at least until the end of the ninth maintenance period of 2011 on 11
October 2011” (European Central Bank 2011). For the national central banks of Target2
debtor countries the promise of full allotment does not give any incentive to directly care
about the Target2 liabilities because ﬁnancing via the ECB is possible to any scope at
nearly any time (depending only on the calendar for tender operations).
In the next part of this paper, we will see how the expanded monetary base of the GIPS
countries and the lower demand for base money in the Target2 creditor countries (GLNF)
can be integrated into the capital market of the New Austrian Economics Model.14 4 THE NEW AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS MODEL
4 The New Austrian Economics Model of the Capital
Market and its Application to the European Debt
Crisis
4.1 Introduction: The one country equilibrium case
The following three diagrams in Figure 8 depict the situation of a single closed economy
in total equilibrium as it follows from the New Austrian approach of economics: at the
bottom, we have the classical capital market where the intersection between Savings S(i)
and Investment I(i) determines the interest rate in equilibrium, i∗ (the natural rate of
interest). Above this diagram, we ﬁnd the overall production possibilities curve. Point A
denotes the actual division of production between investment goods and consumer goods.
The last diagram on the left side represents v. Hayek’s famous triangle: The horizontal
leg of this triangle measures (read from left to right) “goods in process moving through
time from the inception to the completion of the production process” (Garrison 2002,
p. 47). It can also be seen to represent “the separate stages of production” (ibid.), starting
with the early and ending with the ﬁnal stages. The vertical leg/axis stands for the
output of consumer goods which can be produced, once the beginning of the production
process (point A on the horizontal leg) is deﬁned. The surface between the hypotenuse
of v. Hayek’s triangle, the vertical axis and the horizontal leg measures the output of
intermediate goods engaged – together with the original factors of production labor and
land – in the production of consumer goods. The angle α is hence a proxy for the
productivity of the intermediate goods and equals in equilibrium the natural rate of
interest.4.1 Introduction: The one country equilibrium case 15




















Sources: Garrison 2002, Sell 2010.
The logic of the diagrams has to be understood from the bottom to the top and then
from the right to the left: in the ﬁrst place, the capital market determines the equilibrium
size of savings and investment and the equilibrium rate of interest. Given the production
possibilities frontier, the amount of available consumer goods is then determined. Given
the rate of interest and hence the angle α, the point A is determined in v. Hayek’s tri-
angle which stands for the implicit length of the production process. Now let us assume
that the original equilibrium is destroyed as a result of a change in the time preference of
households: the savings function shifts to the right to its new position S(i’), the equilib-
rium interest rate comes down to its new level i∗’, investment raises according to point B
on the production possibilities function. The output of consumer goods necessarily falls;
the now lower interest rate “favors relatively long-term investment. Resources are bid
away from late stages of production, where demand is weak because of the currently low16 4 THE NEW AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS MODEL
consumption, and into early stages, where demand is strong because of the lower rate of
interest” (Garrison 2002, p. 63). Correspondingly, the new point B on the horizontal leg
of the triangle is located to the left of point A and the new angle β is smaller than α. This
is about the same statement as recognizing that the natural rate of interest has fallen on
the capital market and/or that the productivity of intermediate goods is now lower than
it once was before. Notice that the increased saving makes a strengthened future demand
for consumption possible and that the growth rate of the economy will be higher after the
capital restructuring than it was before (ibid., pp. 63/64).
These “macroeconomics of capital structure” will now be extended in order to analyze the
eﬀects of Target2 balances on EMU. To do so, we will create a two countries/two areas
framework, a task which, to our knowledge, introduces an innovation into the diagram-
matic framework of the New Austrian model of economics.
4.2 The two countries disequilibrium case
There are two areas within EMU, one (on the left hand side of Figure 9) which is charac-
terized by high interest rates, low domestic savings, and a high potential for commercial
capital imports and a second one (on the right hand side of Figure 9) with inverse prop-
erties (high savings, low interest rates and a high potential for capital exports). In the
following, we analyze the three scenarios which are relevant for our subject:
(i) The years 1999 through mid-2007
(ii) The years mid-2007 through 2011 if Target2 would not have been operative
(iii) The years mid-2007 through 2011 with Target2 being operative and eﬀective4.2 The two countries disequilibrium case 17
Figure 9: The two countries disequilibrium case




































(i) Initially, as it was the case in the period between 1999 and mid-2007, Target2 (or
likewise its predecessor Target) played no signiﬁcant role for central bank money
ﬂows between the two areas. Instead, commercial capital ﬂows satisﬁed the demand
to ﬁnance each country’s current account deﬁcit/surplus: the excess demand for
savings in the left part of the diagram matches the excess supply of savings in the
right section. As interest rates tended to converge at ˜ i (with interest rates coming
down from a higher level i∗
0 in the GIPS countries and interest rates rising from
a lower level i∗
0’ in the GLNF countries), the consumption production point, CS
(CS’), of the GIPS (GLNF) countries moved downwards (upwards) to the right18 4 THE NEW AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS MODEL
(left), the consumption demand point, CD, of the GIPS (GLNF) countries (CD’)
moved upwards to the left (downwards to the right) as investment was expanded
(reduced). In v. Hayek’s triangle, the capital structure was reorganized in favor
of long-term (short-term) investment in the GIPS (GLNF) countries. Intermediate
goods were bid away from late (early) stages of production, where demand was weak
because of the currently low consumption (investment), and into early (late) stages,
where demand was strong because of the lower (higher) rate of interest.
This phase is characterized by a (mal-)investment boom, a lower production of
consumption goods and above average (but unsustainable) growth in the GIPS
countries going along with weak investment, a higher production of consumption
goods and little if any economic growth in the GLNF countries.
(ii) The hypothetical scenario of “autarky” in both regions (where the relevant variables
show a subscript “0”) reveals a relatively high (low) natural rate of interest in the
GIPS (GLNF) countries. The equilibrium points on the respective eﬃcient frontiers
are C0 and C0’, the equilibrium interest rates are i∗
0 and i∗
0’. This scenario is not
so much out of sight as one may expect because it also represents quite well the
virtual situation after 2007 if Target2 would not have been operative and eﬀective
(see above). As Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) argue, voluntary capital exports
from the GLNF countries to the GIPS countries fell to values close to zero after the
Lehman Brothers collapse. The GIPS countries were, so to say, no longer able to
generate a deﬁcit of their current account ﬁnanced by commercial capital ﬂows.
They were, however, unable to generate a surplus in their balance of the current
account either (see Sell 2011) for the reason that earlier investment expenditures
were not steered into sectors where the countries involved could hold comparative
advantages, but were concentrated primarily on the sector of Nontradables (such
as housing, local bank services etc.). Notice that under this scenario the capital
structure in both regions would have experienced notable changes vis-à-vis to the4.2 The two countries disequilibrium case 19
ﬁrst scenario: the natural rate of interest is now high (low) in the GIPS (GLNF)
countries, the production of consumption goods is relatively high (low) in the GIPS
(GLNF) countries, whereas investment expenditures are weak (strong). Under this
scenario, hence, the GIPS (GLNF) countries could have moved towards later (ear-
lier) stages of investment and towards less external imbalances.
(iii) In sharp contrast, the very much real Target2 scenario after 2008 introduces a wedge
between the preferences of consumers and the production decisions of entrepreneurs:
In both regions, a new internal and external disequilibrium emerges: “Toward the
end of 2010 ... accumulated imports (of the GIPS countries, the authors) amounted
to ... 44 billion Euros. This was 12% of the entire capital requirement created by the
current account deﬁcit. Fully 88% was evidently ﬁnanced by the Target balances,
i.e. by the money-printing press.” (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 32) In our
subsequent analysis we simplify things and assume that 100% of the current account
deﬁcit was ﬁnanced by the Target balances.
Due to the expansionary (contractive) eﬀects of Target2 liabilities (claims) on the original
monetary base in the GIPS (GLNF) area, the eﬀective market rate of interest falls (rises)
below (above) the natural rate in the GIPS (GLNF) countries. It is an increased (lowered)
supply of loanable funds which causes the interest rate to fall (rise). The newly created
central bank money through Target2 (∆MT) drives a wedge between saving and invest-
ment: consumers in the GIPS (GLNF) countries take their decisions according to their
respective savings function, investors analogously according to their respective overall in-
vestment function. There is now an excess demand ED (excess supply ES) for consumer
goods in the GIPS (GNLF) area. As Figure 9 demonstrates, the concomitant excess
demand (supply) of consumer goods in the GIPS (GLNF) countries together with the
increase, +∆I (drop, −∆I), in investment expenditures in the GIPS (GLNF) countries
matches the increase in Target2 liabilities (claims) respectively. The impact on v. Hayek’s20 4 THE NEW AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS MODEL
triangle and the structure of capital is about the same as in scenario (i), but quite diﬀerent
to that ﬁrst scenario, the impact on the capital structure in the GLNF countries is now
“involuntary”, mildly spoken. Notice also that the productivity of intermediate goods
as measured previously by the angle α (β) is now lower (higher) in the GIPS (GLNF)
countries as γ < α (δ > β).
Opposite to the ﬁrst scenario, the impact of the now functioning Target2 mechanism forces
the GLNF countries into an involuntary excess supply in the production of consumer goods
going along with a reduction of their domestic investment expenditures. In other words:
the GIPS countries are now in the position to enforce in their own economies – via the
Target2 operations – an excess demand for consumer goods going along with an increase
in investment expenditures.
4.3 A Static welfare evaluation of Target2
In Figure 10, we have now the possibility to compare our three scenarios (with rearranged
numbering) in terms of static welfare, i.e. rent units:2
(i) The years mid-2007 through 2011 if Target2 would not have been operative are
represented by the equilibria “in autarky” G and G’; these solutions serve here forth
as a reference for the subsequent welfare evaluation.
(ii) The years 1999 through mid-2007 led to capital inﬂows (outﬂows) in the size of
FH or H’F’ respectively; in both economic clusters we record a net welfare gain
corresponding to the triangles FGH and H’F’G’ (vertically dashed), a result which
is very well known from economic textbooks. In the GIPS countries, the gains
2 The following analysis diﬀers at least in two aspects from Sinn (2010): ﬁrst, we model ﬂows of sav-
ings/investment instead of ﬂows of capital goods. Second, we disregard from the “overheating eﬀects”
which are associated with the ﬁnancing of investment expenditures by the GLNF countries in the GIPS
countries. As Sinn shows, such overshooting of capital outﬂows creates losses in GDP per capita terms
(ibid., p. 13) for the capital exporting countries.4.3 A Static welfare evaluation of Target2 21
in investors’ rent (gray shaded) outweigh the losses in savers’ rent (AGFB) while
in the GLNF countries the gains in savers’ rent (B’F’G’A’) outweigh the losses in
investors’ rent (gray shaded, too). We are aware of the fact that this welfare balance
is somewhat optimistic (see footnote 2).
(iii) The years mid-2007 through 2011 with Target2 being operative and eﬀective are
somewhat more complicated to be evaluated: starting with the GIPS countries,
there are gains in investors’ rent to an amount of AGHB (gray shaded, identical with
scenario (ii)). At the same time, there are now gains in rent which accrue both to
savers, but also to the Target2 mechanism corresponding to the diﬀerence between
the area KFHN (diagonally dashed) and the area AGFB (horizontally dashed).
Overall, we ﬁnd gains in savers’ and Target2 rent so that the Target2 scenario leads
to net welfare gains for the GIPS countries which exceed the gains of the second
scenario.























Gains investors´ rent Losses investors´rent
Losses savers´ and Target rent
Gains savers´and Target rent
Overall gains savers´and Target rent
Gains savers´and Target rent
Losses savers´and Target rent
Overall losses savers´ and Target rent
GIPS GLNF
P‘
Net gains scenario (ii) Net gains scenario (ii)
Source: Own depiction inspired by Brakman et al. 2006, p. 192.22 5 SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
In contrast, the GLNF countries suﬀer from net welfare losses due to the Target2 mech-
anism: the small area of gains which accrue to savers and Target2 B’H’P’A’ (diagonally
dashed) are outweighed by the losses of investors’ rent B’H’G’A’ (gray shaded, identi-
cal with scenario (ii)) and the large area of losses which accrue to savers and Target2
N’P’G’K’ (horizontally dashed). Notice that the Target2 scenario hence produces a net
welfare transfer from the GLNF countries to the GIPS countries where the overall welfare
balance for both clusters of countries should converge to zero. This result matches the
earlier ﬁnding that the aggregate eﬀects of the Target2 balances on the monetary base of
the ECB add up to nil.
5 Some Conclusions and Suggestions for Economic
Policy
As our paper conﬁrms, Target2 balances tend to make endogenous, if not the size of the
monetary base in the Euro area, truly its composition. Notice that – opposite to the
theory of the (exogenous) money multiplier – it is the process of credit and book money
creation within commercial banks which drives (the composition of) the monetary base
via the Target2 mechanism.
Moreover, the initial direction of causation seems to run from the business sector in
countries severely aﬀected by the European debt crisis to their local bank and from there
to the respective national central bank. If so, then there is a striking similarity – to the
best of our knowledge not yet discovered by other authors on this subject – to the theory
of inertial inﬂation (Blejer and Cheasty 1987; Bresser Perreira and Nakano 1987; Sell
1990): here, companies which act on markets with rather imperfect competition have to
face a continuous process of cost increase fueled by indexation schemes (of wages, interest
rates, the exchange rate, etc.). They intend to pass the cost increase on prices. Also, they23
need credit from their local banks to ﬁnance working capital and to roll over the ﬁrm’s
debt. These local banks, in turn, push the central bank to enhance the possibilities of
reﬁnancing and to provide enough liquidity. Thereby, the money supply becomes fully
endogenous and the central bank simply accommodates the price increases on product
markets.
Of course, it is true that also capital ﬂight is represented in the Target2 balances. This
issue is addressed by Buiter et al. (2011) and more recently by Abad et al. (2011). As
interesting as this exercise may be, it does not help too much for the observed excessive
absorption of goods and services in the GIPS countries issue. If private capital from
the rest of Europe or elsewhere was reluctant to ﬁnance such excessive absorption was it
possibly a re-import of capital ﬂight which helped? Let’s be serious.
But what can be done?
In principle two diﬀerent approaches to correct the European Payment Settlement System
are possible: Either a setup of new institutional arrangements or a change in the rules of
existing institutions.
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) favor the ﬁrst alternative and recommend to follow rules
functioning in the US – “the Interdistrict Settlement Accounts demand from each Fed
branch that they settle the mutually build-up interdistrict balances in April of each year”
(ibid., p. 46). Buiter at al. (2011) have serious doubts whether this arrangement functions
in the US at all. Even if this Settlements functions well in the US, one has to consider
if it could be successfully transferred and adapted to the European environment, because
the Federal Reserve System of the US is not equivalent to the ESCB. Therefore, it may
be worthwhile to think also about changes in the stance and/or the behavior of the ECB
in order to reduce/cap/eliminate the Target2 balances:
So what about a change in ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations to reduce the “ECB’s
stealth bailout”?24 5 SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) think that neither the renunciation of the full allotment
policy of the current ﬁxed rate tender nor a change to a variable interest rate tender would
help reducing the Target2 imbalances, because “it would not be able to prevent the least
solid commercial banks from making the highest interest rate oﬀers because anything they
oﬀer is more favourable than the excessively high interest rates they have to oﬀer private
lenders. The lion’s share of the central bank credit would therefore still be created in
the GIPS countries.” (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 43) Buiter et al. (2011, p. 4)
agree with this statement but use another argumentation: As long as commercial banks
have enough eligible assets as collateral they are able to get liquidity at full allotment via
the marginal lending facility even if the main reﬁnancing operation volumes were limited.
Therefore Target2 imbalances were “independent” of the main reﬁnancing operations’
shaping.
Changes in the main reﬁnancing operations do not have any short-run signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the reﬁnancing possibilities of commercial banks. But one has to recognize that ﬁnancing
via the marginal lending facility is much more expensive (even during the acute crisis the
interest rate corridor held, meaning the lending rate provides the ceiling for overnight
lending) and that it is only an overnight solution for liquidity scarcity. Figure 11 shows
the volumes of the main reﬁnancing operations, the marginal lending facility, and the
deposit facility since the beginning of the monetary union. Before the ﬁnancial crisis, the
volumes in the deposit facility showed neither ﬂuctuations nor a trend; they were nearly
negligible. The volumes in the marginal lending facility ﬂuctuated at the beginning of
the Eurosystem but calmed with the change from a ﬁxed rate tender to a variable rate
tender.25



















































































































































































































































Deposit facility (left scale) Main refinancing operation (left scale)
Marginal lending facility (right scale)
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse, Minimum Reserve and Liquidity Statistics,
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browseAdvancedFilter.do?DATASET=1&sﬂ3=4&BS_ITEM=L022&BS
_ITEM=A055&BS_ITEM=A051&node=bbn135&saf3=1&saf4=1&saf5=1, accessed: July 27th, 2011.
The start of the ﬁnancial crisis can be identiﬁed very easy. The loss in trustworthiness
of the interbank market is reﬂected by the large upward deﬂections of the volumes of the
deposit facility as well as those of the marginal lending facility. The change back to a ﬁxed
rate tender (here with full allotment) was implemented in October 2008, after the marginal
lending facility peaked. Times of high ﬂuctuations in the marginal lending facility’s
volumes were only at the beginning of the monetary union and during the ﬁnancial crisis
(during both periods the ECB used a ﬁxed rate tender). When the ECB operated its
main reﬁnancing operations via a variable rate tender, the marginal lending facility was
less used. Therefore there is no indication that commercial banks use – or will use – the
marginal lending facility to get liquidity with “full allotment” even if the ECB limits it via
its main reﬁnancing operations, especially not if the interest rates rise again. Nevertheless,
the ECB will not be able to reduce its “stealth bailout” by changing the shape of its main
reﬁnancing operations.26 5 SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
But the self-servicing attitude among the GIPS countries should be banned by the ECB:
a mechanism which favors countries with Target2 claims and penalizes countries with
Target2 liabilities should be designed and installed. For instance a penalty could be
to temporarily exclude those countries from reﬁnancing operations that are reluctant to
balance their Target2 liabilities with the ECB in an appropriate time span.
The ECB itself should be encouraged to publish data on Target2 balances in order to
increase the transparency of its monetary policy. But transparency is not enough: In the
context of the European debt crisis the ECB should go back to its earlier policy of asking
for suﬃcient quality of the collateral involved in reﬁnancing operations. This goes far
beyond the Target2 problem and aﬀects the long-term reputation of the ECB, which has
been damaged during the European debt crisis.
For example, the “ECB allowed the Greek state to run a gigantic budget deﬁcit ... by
resorting to the European money-printing press” (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 25)
via Target2. This construction weakness of the EMU points at the urgent necessity
to reformulate and strengthen the European Stability and Growth Pact, whose major
intention should be to limit public deﬁcits and to bring down the huge debt to GDP
ratios in the European area.
Last, but not least: Following classical economists, any turbulence in the monetary sphere
is just a mirror of distortions and malfunctions in the “real” sphere of the economy: If a
key problem underlying the Target2 mechanism is the fact that GIPS countries wish to
import more goods than they export, it is indispensable that these countries search for
new comparative advantages in goods and services. This applies to every exchange rate
regime they may choose in the foreseeable future.27
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